Risk-taking
is back for banks 1 year after crisis By
Stevenson Jacobs Associated Press 09.13.09
NEW YORK
– A year after the financial system nearly collapsed, the
nation's biggest banks are bigger and regaining their appetite
for risk.
Goldman
Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and others — which have received tens
of billions of dollars in federal aid — are once more
betting big on bonds, commodities and exotic financial
products, trading that nearly stopped during the financial
crisis.
That
Wall Street is making money again in essentially the same ways
that thrust the banking system into chaos last fall is reason
for concern on several levels, financial analysts and
government officials say.
•
There have been no significant changes to the federal rules
governing their behavior. Proposals that have been made to
better monitor the financial system and to police the products
banks sell to consumers have been held up by lobbyists,
lawmakers and turf-protecting regulators.
•
Through mergers and the failure of Lehman Brothers, the
mammoth banks whose near-collapse prompted government rescues
have gotten even bigger, increasing the risk they pose to the
financial system. And they still make bets that, in the
aggregate, are worth far more than the capital they have on
hand to cover against potential losses.
•
The government's response to last year's meltdown was to spend
whatever it takes to protect the financial system from
collapse — a precedent that could encourage even greater
risk-taking from the private sector.
Lawrence
Summers, director of the White House National Economic
Council, says an overhaul of financial regulations is needed
as soon as possible to keep the financial system safe over the
long haul.
"You
cannot rely on the scars of past crises to ensure against
practices that will lead to future crises," Summers says.
No
one is predicting another meltdown from risky trading in the
near term. Rather, the concern is what happens over time as
banks' confidence grows and the memory of the financial crisis
of 2008 fades.
Will
they pile on bets to the point that a new asset bubble forms
and — as happened with mortgage-backed securities — its
undoing endangers banks and the broader economy?
"We're
seeing the same kind of behavior from the banks, and that
could lead to some huge and scary parallels," says Simon
Johnson, former chief economist with the International
Monetary Fund.
Some
risk-taking is good. When banks are willing to invest in
companies or lend to home-buyers, that nurtures economic
growth by generating employment and consumer spending, feeding
a cycle of expansion.
The
problem is when banks' quest for profits leads them to take on
too much risk. In the case of the housing bubble, which burst
last year, banks lent too freely to consumers with weak credit
and wagered too much on complex financial instruments tied to
mortgages. As real-estate prices turned south, so did the
financial industry's health.
Because
the largest banks' trading divisions make their bets with each
other, their fortunes are intertwined. The collapse of one can
threaten another — and another — if it is unable to pay
off its debts.
This
so-called counterparty risk is a major reason the Obama
administration's regulatory overhaul plan calls for the
creation of a "systemic risk regulator."
The
administration is also seeking tougher capital requirements
for banks, arguing that banks' buying of exotic financial
products without keeping enough cash on reserve was a key
cause of the crisis. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has
urged the Group of 20 nations — which meets this month in
Pittsburgh
— to agree on new capital levels by the end of 2010 and put
them in place two years later. Geithner hasn't said how much
extra capital banks should be required to keep on hand.
Data
from the April-June quarter show that the banks are leaning
heavily again on their trading desks for revenue.
•
During the fourth quarter of 2008, when the financial crisis
made even the shrewdest bankers risk-averse, Goldman's trading
of risky assets nearly stopped. But in the second quarter of
2009, trading revenue had climbed to nearly 50 percent of
total revenue, closer to where it was two years ago before the
recession began. JP Morgan's reliance on trading revenue has
exhibited a similar pattern.
•
Also in the second quarter, the five biggest banks' average
potential losses from a single day of trading topped $1
billion, up 76 percent from two years ago, according to
regulatory filings.
The
government hasn't just watched banks resume their freewheeling
ways and prosper. It has been an enabler in the process. The
Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp. — during both the Bush and Obama
administrations — have made trillions of dollars available
to the biggest banks through bailouts, low-cost loans and loss
guarantees designed to stabilize the financial system.
The
failure of Lehman Brothers — the biggest bankruptcy in U.S.
history — and the panicky sales of Bear Stearns to JPMorgan
and Merrill Lynch to Bank of America, also have transformed
Wall Street. The surviving investment banks have fewer
competitors and more market share.
Five
of the biggest banks — Goldman, JPMorgan, Wells Fargo,
Citigroup and Bank of
America
— posted second-quarter profits totaling $13 billion. That's
more than double what they made in the second quarter of 2008
and nearly two-thirds as much as the $20.7 billion they earned
in the second quarter of 2007 — when the economy was strong.
Meanwhile,
Bank of America and Wells Fargo today originate 41 percent of
all home loans that are backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
according to Inside Mortgage Finance. The banks made $284
billion in such loans in the first half of this year, up from
$124 billion during the same period last year.
"The
big banks now are more powerful than before," said
Johnson, now a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology's Sloan School of Management. "Their market
share has grown and they have a lot of clout in
Washington
."
Wall
Street's recovery is also being aided by a stock-market rally
that has driven the S&P 500 index up nearly 54 percent
since March 9, when it hit a 12-year low.
Despite
the return to profitability, these aren't the high-octane days
from before the crisis. To qualify for government backing, the
biggest Wall Street firms are no longer allowed to supercharge
their returns by borrowing up to 30 times the value of their
assets to place bets on stocks, bonds and other investments.
Businesses
supported by Wall Street bankers and traders say they've also
noticed changes. Namely, their customers aren't spending as
much on food, drinks and entertainment as they did during the
boom years.
At
Fraunces Tavern, a high-end bar just around the corner from
the New York Stock Exchange, the Wall Street workers who used
to drink $25 glasses of port are scarce these days.
"Now
we're doing happy hours," says Damon Testaverde, one of
the owners of Fraunces Tavern. "We never did that.
There's just less bodies around."
But
one thing fundamental to Wall Street hasn't changed: Big banks
and their traders are still finding creative — some say
speculative — ways to profit.
They're
still packaging risky mortgages into securities and selling
them to investors, who can earn higher returns by purchasing
the securities tied to the riskiest mortgages. That was the
practice that helped inflate the real estate bubble and
eventually spread financial pain around the globe.
In
a way, the government has emboldened banks to keep selling
risky securities: Since the crisis erupted, federal emergency
programs have helped keep the banks from failing. But now, as
the financial system recovers, the government plans to phase
out these backstops — leaving banks more vulnerable to big
bets that go bad.
One
investment gaining popularity is a direct descendant of the
mortgage-backed securities that devastated many banks last
year. To get some lesser performing assets off their books,
banks are taking slices of bonds made up of high-risk mortgage
securities and pooling them with slices of bonds comprised of
low-risk mortgage securities. With the blessing of debt
ratings agencies, banks are then selling this class of bonds
as a low-risk investment. The market for these products has
hit $30 billion, according to Morgan Stanley.
"It
may be unpleasant to hear that the traders are riding
high," said Walter Bailey, chief executive of boutique
merchant banking firm EpiGroup. "But, hey, it's a
pay-for-performance thing, and they're performing like
mad."
And
that means the return of another Wall Street mainstay: Lavish
compensation.
After
10 of the largest banks received a $250 billion lifeline from
the government last fall, some lawmakers were outraged that
employees were being paid seven-figure salaries even though
their companies nearly collapsed. A handful of top executives,
including Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit, have agreed to accept
pay of just $1 this year. But the compensation of most
high-performing traders hasn't changed.
Goldman
spent $6.6 billion in the second quarter on pay and benefits,
34 percent more than two years ago. And Citigroup, now
one-third owned by the government after taking $45 billion in
federal money, owes a star energy trader $100 million.
The
CEO of Goldman, Lloyd Blankfein, said at a banking conference
in
Germany
last week that excessive banker pay works "against the
public interest." He said bonuses are important to
attract and retain top talent, but "misapplied, they can
also encourage excess."
The
Obama administration has proposed measures to diminish the
risk posed by large banks. They include forcing banks to hold
more capital to cover losses and trying to increase the
transparency of markets in which banks trade the most complex
— and potentially risky — financial products.
One
major component of the Obama plan — creating an agency to
oversee the marketing of financial products to consumers —
will be difficult to pass in Congress. Industry lobbying
against it and other proposed financial rules has been fierce.
Lobbyists
for hedge funds, the large investment pools that cater to the
rich, have been able to fend off proposals that would require
them to register with the SEC and regularly disclose their
holdings.
And
they, too, are profitable again after a dismal 2008. The 1,000
largest hedge funds in Morningstar's database posted average
returns of 11.9 percent through July. In 2008, those same
funds lost 22 percent on average.
"Have
there been changes around the edges?" says Timothy Brog,
portfolio manager of New York-based hedge fund Locksmith
Capital. "Absolutely. Have their been systematic changes?
Absolutely not."
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